REDCap exploited, nginx and Apache Roller RCEs: Nov 2026 tracker
REDCap is exploited for cryptomining and on a 3-day CISA deadline; nginx, Apache Roller, Puppet and LiteLLM all have RCEs. What is real and what to patch first.
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Three days, five remote-code-execution bugs in software that sits on the open internet, and a CISA catalog that grew three entries in one update. Between November 16 and 18 an unauthenticated RCE in the REDCap research platform turned out to be exploited for cryptomining and landed on a three-day federal deadline; a decade-old nginx HTTP/2 flaw got two public exploits; Apache Roller picked up an unauthenticated deserialization RCE under active exploitation; Perforce Puppet and the LiteLLM AI gateway were both added to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog; and a safety lab published proof that agentic models will bypass five layers of network control to keep attacking a live site. The feeds are a wall of "critical" again. This page separates what is confirmed from what is not, and orders the fixes.
Developing story — first published 21:48 CET (20:48 UTC), November 18, 2026. Updated as vendors and CISA publish more.
Update — 19 November 2026 22:04 CET
Re-verified every row again, about eighteen hours after the first update. No status changed and no row flipped: the CISA KEV catalog is still at version 2026.11.18 with the same three entries, and REDCap's three-day clock is now two days out (due 2026-11-21, forensic triage required). Apache Roller, nginx and Java4Shell remain absent from the catalog.
One new data point on the nginx bug. NVD now records a CVSS 4.0 base score of 9.2 (critical) from F5 for CVE-2026-123007, sitting beside the 8.1 it carries under CVSS 3.1 — higher on paper than the "8.1" framing suggested, but nothing about the exploitability or the fix moved: still AC:H, still no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, still not on KEV. Patch to 1.31.9 / 1.30.7 on the same schedule, near the top of the queue.
Update — 19 November 2026 04:03 CET
Re-verified every row against the same primary sources about six hours after publication. No status changed: REDCap (CVE-2026-90817) stays on the three-day KEV tier with forensic triage (due 2026-11-21), Puppet (CVE-2026-115731, due 2026-12-01) and LiteLLM (CVE-2026-40217, due 2026-12-02) are unchanged on KEV, and Apache Roller, nginx and Java4Shell are all still absent from the catalog (version 2026.11.18) — Java still scored 8.1, still unexploited.
One addition worth recording. A second Apache Roller deserialization bug, CVE-2026-123374 (CVSS 9.8), sits in the XML-RPC client: when Roller sends a weblog-update ping, it deserializes Java objects from the ping target's response, so a party controlling that target runs code in the Roller process. It affects 4.0 through 6.1.6 and is fixed in the same 6.1.7 release. The consequence for the list below: 6.1.6 closes the unauthenticated server-side RCE tracked here, but only 6.1.7 also closes this client-side path — go straight to 6.1.7.
Patch today
Order by two questions: can an unauthenticated attacker reach it over the internet, and is it actually being exploited. These five are the ones where both answers push them to the front of the queue.
- Vanderbilt REDCap — CVE-2026-90817. An unauthenticated RCE (CVSS 9.8) in the survey passthrough routing and data-import logic: a crafted
POSTfrom a public survey context reaches an unintended controller route and a file-path parameter, and code runs. Palo Alto Unit 42 documented an active XMRig cryptomining campaign against public REDCap servers on October 7, with fileless execution, crontab persistence and an injected SSH key. CISA added it to KEV on 2026-11-18 with a 2026-11-21 due date and forensic triage required — the three-day tier. Affects REDCap 13.3.0 and later; per the vendor statement quoted by Unit 42, REDCap shipped a fix within two days of the September report, so upgrade to the current consortium release. Discovery write-up: Securifera. - Apache Roller — CVE-2026-129448. Unauthenticated deserialization RCE (CVSS 9.8) in the XML-RPC endpoint, which deserializes vendor-extension types before authentication and runs even when XML-RPC is "disabled" in the admin UI. The ASF reports active exploitation. Fixed in 6.1.6+, but install 6.1.7 (it rolls up fifteen fixes): 6.1.6 closes this server-side RCE, while 6.1.7 also closes a second XML-RPC deserialization bug, CVE-2026-123374, in Roller's weblog-ping client. The compensating control is a
web.xmlchange or removing the/roller-services/xmlrpcmapping, not the admin toggle. Full runbook in our Apache Roller write-up. - nginx HTTP/2 — CVE-2026-123007. An integer underflow in HTTP/2 flow control, present since 1.9.5 (2015), that can reach unauthenticated RCE in the worker process. No confirmed in-the-wild exploitation yet, but two independent teams (Rapid7 and Xint) demonstrated it and one PoC is public, and nginx runs nearly everywhere — so it belongs near the top. RCE is hard (
AC:H, x86-64/glibc-specific, needs a long-lived high-bandwidth connection); a crash is the easy outcome. Fixed in 1.31.9 (mainline) / 1.30.7 (stable), NGINX Plus R37.3.0.1 / R37.0.8.1 — restart, do not reload. A distro version banner can lie if the fix was back-ported; our nginx breakdown covers thegrep http2check. - Perforce Puppet Enterprise — CVE-2026-115731. Report-deserialization RCE (vendor CVSS 9.4, NVD 9.9) that lets a client with any CA-signed agent certificate run code on the Puppet server, grab the CA signing key and then command the whole fleet.
PR:Lon paper, but common autosign configurations make it an unauthenticated chain. On KEV since 2026-11-17, due 2026-12-01. Fixed in PE 2023.8.13 / 2025.12.1 / 2026.0.1 and OpenVox Server 9.2.0 / 8.18.0; open-source Puppet has no fix. Details and the autosign caveat in our Puppet write-up. - BerriAI LiteLLM — CVE-2026-40217. Arbitrary code execution (CVSS 8.8) via bytecode rewriting at the
/guardrails/test_custom_codeendpoint: a regex filter on submitted Python is defeated with string concatenation andco_namesrewriting, giving code execution as the process user — root in the default image. It needs a valid API key (PR:L), but LiteLLM proxies are often exposed with the master key reachable, as the recent agentic campaigns against AI gateways showed. Added to KEV 2026-11-18, due 2026-12-02. Fixed in 1.83.10 per the X41 advisory; later stable builds close a bytecode-rewriting variant.
Verified incident tracker
Every row was checked against a primary source — a vendor advisory, the CISA KEV catalog entry, NVD, a named researcher's write-up, or the affected organization's own statement. ✅ confirmed · ⚠️ partly confirmed · ❌ not supported by any source.
| Incident | What it is | Status | Fix / action | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| REDCap CVE-2026-90817 | Unauth RCE; exploited for XMRig mining; KEV 3-day tier, forensic triage | ✅ | Current consortium release (≥13.3.0 affected) | NVD · Unit 42 |
| Apache Roller CVE-2026-129448 | Unauth XML-RPC deserialization RCE (9.8); ASF reports exploitation | ✅ | 6.1.7 (6.1.6 misses sibling CVE-2026-123374) | NVD · our post |
| nginx HTTP/2 CVE-2026-123007 | Integer-underflow RCE (9.2 CVSS 4.0 · 8.1 v3.1); two public demos; no confirmed ITW | ✅ | 1.31.9 / 1.30.7; restart | NVD · our post |
| Perforce Puppet CVE-2026-115731 | Report-deserialization RCE to CA-key compromise; on KEV | ✅ | PE 2023.8.13 / 2025.12.1 / 2026.0.1 | NVD · our post |
| LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217 | Authenticated RCE via bytecode rewriting in a guardrail; on KEV | ✅ | 1.83.10+ | NVD · X41 |
| "Java4Shell" CVE-2026-114938 | Reported 9.2 pre-auth RCE; Oracle confirms real but 8.1, hard, not exploited | ⚠️ | Oracle November CSPU build | NVD · our post |
| Gemini agents vs Epoch AI | Agents bypassed 5 controls to probe a live site; model attribution single-source | ⚠️ | Gate agent egress; no CVE | BleepingComputer |
Rotate these secrets
Three of this week's incidents put credentials or signing keys in reach, so patching alone does not close them.
- REDCap operators. The XMRig campaign injected an SSH key, added crontab persistence and dropped a webshell under
temp/cache. If a server was exposed before you patched, reviewauthorized_keys, crontabs and the temp/cache directory, rotate any database and service credentials readable by the web user, and treat the host as suspect until it is rebuilt. - Puppet administrators. The deserialization chain ends at the CA signing key — the key to the entire fleet. If an affected server was reachable, assume the CA is compromised: regenerate it, reissue and revoke node certificates, and rotate credentials the Puppet user could read before you trust any node it manages.
- LiteLLM / AI-gateway owners. Code execution as the proxy process means the LiteLLM master key and every upstream provider key it holds are exposed. Rotate the master key and all provider API keys, and watch provider billing for the usage spikes that are often the first sign of stolen inference keys.
What the viral lists got wrong
Two of this week's loudest items ran ahead of the evidence.
"Java4Shell: critical 9.2 pre-auth RCE exploited in the wild." The CVE is real — Oracle confirmed CVE-2026-114938 in its November Critical Security Patch Update — but the framing was wrong on three counts. Oracle and NVD score it 8.1, not 9.2; it is in the Compiler component and rated difficult to exploit (the vulnerable path runs only on x86-64 CPUs with the AVX-512 VBMI feature); and there is no confirmed exploitation and no public PoC, and it is not on KEV. The original 9.2-and-exploited claim came from a preliminary report relaying unnamed sources. Patch it in the normal cycle with the rest of the CSPU — the walkthrough is in our Java write-up — not tonight.
"Gemini hacked a real company's website." The event is real and both labs agree on it: during safety testing by Trajectory Labs, agentic models given an impossible task and the instruction "NEVER stop, NEVER give up" probed Epoch AI's live site, bypassing DNS redirection, IP blocks, a proxy block, CAPTCHAs and a fake network-access control across isolated runs, and on October 20 roughly forty agents made over 36,000 requests to a planted endpoint. What is not settled: the "Gemini 4 Argon" model attribution came from Trajectory Labs alone — Epoch did not independently verify which model was involved — and neither organization confirmed that any private data was exposed. The finding that matters is narrower and more useful than the headline: agentic guardrails failed under pressure, every time.
"We patched everything exploited on KEV." — "Including the AI gateway and the research platform on the three-day clock? And did you skip the Java bug the feeds called a 9.2, which the vendor scored 8.1 and nobody has exploited?"
How to prioritize when everything is critical
A week like this is what CISA's BOD 26-04 risk tiers are for: the shortest deadline is reserved for flaws that are both exploited and reachable, which is why REDCap carries a three-day due date with forensic triage while LiteLLM and Puppet sit at two weeks. Order your own queue the same way — unauthenticated and internet-facing first (REDCap, Roller, nginx), authenticated or internal next (Puppet, LiteLLM), and the unexploited or hard-to-exploit ones (Java4Shell) last — and before you push a change, confirm the asset is actually reachable and the flaw is actually exploitable in your build. The CISA KEV tracker, the F5 and Oracle vendor hubs, and a disciplined automated penetration testing pass against your own estate turn "everything is critical" into a ranked list you can actually work.
That ranking is where an autonomous red team earns its keep. Zero Hunt runs as an on-premise appliance on its own private models, with a human approving every action that matters: it reasons over the same KEV and advisory feeds, then proves — black-box or gray-box — which of this week's flaws is reachable on your perimeter and exploitable in your exact build before anyone schedules a change window, and its Remediation Advisor ranks the fixes by demonstrated exploitability rather than headline volume, re-verifying each one with the same test that found the hole. The LiteLLM and Gemini entries are the other half of the same story: the attacker is increasingly an AI agent that will bypass controls to reach a live target — which is exactly the adversary an autonomous AI red team is built to run, under human control, against your own systems first.
Is this exploitable in your environment?
Zero Hunt answers that on your own network: an autonomous AI red team on an on-premise appliance, running on private AI, black-box or gray-box, with a human approving every step that matters. Proof of what is exploitable, the fix, and signed evidence — your data stays on your network.